‘No country which relies on the law of the land to regulate the lives of its citizens can afford to see that law flouted by its own government, even in an insurgency situation. In other words everything done by a government and its agents in combating insurgency must be legal. But this does not mean that the government must work within exactly the same set of laws during an insurgency as existed beforehand, because it is a function of government to make new laws when necessary.’
Thus General Sir Frank Kitson, writing in 1977 for his ‘military autobiography’ Bunch of Five, wherein he described his experience of counter-insurgency work as an army intelligence officer in Kenya (1953-55), Malaya (1957) and Muscat and Oman (1958), as well as his peacekeeping activities in Cyprus during the 1960s. We’re pleased to say that Bunch of Five, along with Kitson’s Directing Operations and Low Intensity Operations, are now available to readers once again through Faber Finds.
Kitson’s fascinating studies have long been influential and keenly debated, and they retain an undying interest in an age when states find they must prosecute more sophisticated, irregular methods of warfare rather than the employment of ‘traditional’ military force – not least in theatres where the latter can have limited effect simply because of the difficulty of finding an enemy to engage with physically.
For Bunch of Five General Kitson did not deal with the period of his career served in Northern Ireland (1970-72) simply because in the mid-1970s this matter was too sensitive. In Kenya he had developed techniques for using ‘pseudo-gangs’ (comprised of surrendered Mau-Mau combatants) to infiltrate the enemy. In Belfast he was appointed to command the 39th Infantry Brigade and was authorised to set up what became known as the Mobile Reconnaissance Force (MRF), an undercover unit comprised of soldiers and former IRA volunteers (known informally as ‘freds’) who had ‘turned’ against republicanism. By 1973 the MRF operation was compromised, and once Kitson’s role in it was public knowledge he became an inevitably controversial figure. Yet Kitson was no shadowy, phantomic character – his views were no secret. In 1970 he had published Low Intensity Operations: Subversion, Insurgency and Peacekeeping, in which he clearly expounded what he considered to be the lessons of his various campaigns to that point.
Anybody interested in following the subsequent lineage of Kitsonian theory will find recent examples and arguments thick on the ground. This 2005 article from The Atlantic put the question “[A]re pseudo-gangs really the best model for the United States in its global war on terror, or in its ongoing battle against Sunni insurgents in Iraq?” More tangentially it is still surely worthy of note that Lieutenant-Colonel Nick Kitson, Commanding Officer of 3rd Battalion The Rifles in Helmand Province, Afghanistan, is General Kitson’s nephew. But to get right up to date, if you consult this piece on the Open Democracy website you will read a consideration of the “striking relevance to events in Britain in recent weeks” afforded by General Kitson’s Low Intensity Operations – specifically in respect of “the question of how a government can combat a campaign of non-violent direct action.” Readers drawn to these timely debates would be well advised to consult and engage with the full range of Kitson’s arguments and observations on the page.
Frank Kitson’s ‘Low Intensity Operations’
14/02/2011 by richardtkelly
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